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Abstract 
It has become clear that exploitation of natural resources may result in 
evolutionary selection pressure resulting in morphological changes of a species 
over time. This potentially adverse effect should be taken into account when 
regulating the use of such resources. In this paper we present a bioeconomic 
model where we analyse the effect of selective harvesting on genetic frequency for 
one specific gene in terms of the socially optimal long-term management of the 
resource. It is assumed that the individuals carrying the gene have a lower 
natural mortality rate but are also more valuable to catch. Results indicate that 
the relationship between the natural rate of selection against less valuable 
individuals and the interest rate is crucial in determining whether the valuable 
gene should be preserved or allowed to become extinct. To our knowledge this is 
the first economic model of resource harvesting when harvesting directly affects 
the rate of selection in a genetic model. 
 
 
                                     
* The authors are grateful for comments from Niels Christian Stenseth.   3
Introduction 
The principles of modern management of renewable resources were to a large 
extent developed during the 1950s when intellectual threads from biology and 
economics emerged and formed a rationale for renewable resource management, 
(Wilen 1999).
1 Since then resource economists have relatively closely followed the 
development in the biological and ecological sciences, and included new wisdom 
from these research areas into the bioeconomic models underlying most of the 
literature on resource management.  
 
However it appears that economists to some degree have missed one strand of the 
ecological and biological literature. At least since the 1970s biologist have been 
aware of the possibility that selective harvesting or hunting could alter the 
genetic pattern of a resource, Heino (1998). Since then, man-made selection 
pressure on wild stocks has been a debated issue in the biological and ecological 
literature. Resource economists on the other hand have only to a limited extent 
shown interest in the management of renewable resources where exploitation 
potentially leads to malign genetic selection. Biologists have long been aware that 
human exploitation of reproducing natural resources may affect these resources 
on a genetic level. Whenever a resource is harvested in a way that is not 
completely random, genetic selection will take place to some degree. Two cases 
have received considerable attention in the ecological literature. Hunters often 
look for specific physiological traits, such as body size or antler size, in their prey, 
Harris  et  al (2002). In fisheries, harvesting technology consistently favors 
individuals of small size. However, any human influence on an ecosystem that 
                                     
1 Wilen (2000) especially mention the articles by Beverton and Holt (1957) and 
Schaefer, (1957) from biology and from Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) in 
economics.   4
consistently and significantly favors or selects against particular genetic traits in 
a species, will affect the genetic distribution of that species. Possibly, due to 
ecological feedbacks, the distribution of genes may be affected within the entire 
ecosystem. 
 
There is a large ecological literature showing both theoretically and empirically 
that confirms that human harvesting affects the distribution of genes in 
ecosystems. Thelen (1991), Jorgenson et al (1993), Reznick, Bryga and Endler 
(1990), Coltman et. al (2003) all examine the effect of hunting on various 
ungulates, Tenhumberg et. al (2003) discuss how kangaroos are affected by 
selective harvesting in Australia, wheras Law (2000), Heino and Godø (2002), 
and Conover and Munch, (2003) among several others examine fisheries. 
Ecologists have recently started to examine the implications of selective 
harvesting for resource management (Heino, 1998). However, ecologists use their 
own notions of objectives for resource management as Maximum Sustainable 
Yield seems to be the objective of choice, Heino (1998). This concept is of course 
fundamentally flawed as a resource management objective, Samuelson (1976).  
 
A rationale for the interest by economist of biodiversity came with the Rio 
Declaration on Biological Diversity. The convention was concluded in the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992. Subsequently it has 
been signed by the requisite number of nations and has now come into effect. In 
the declaration biodiversity is defined as “The variability among living organisms 
from all sources including, inter alia terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes 
diversity within species and of ecosystems'. In this view genetic diversity is in 
itself a good reason to attach value to the existence of genetic variation. This is 
the perspective taken in most of the economic literature where various measures 
of biodiversity assign benefits to genetic variation, Weitzman (1992), Weitzman   5
(1993), how to value these benefits and how to regulate ecosystems with diversity 
measures as policy objectives. Polasky et al (1993), Polasky and Solow (1995). As 
pointed out by Xepapadeas and Broch (2003), (XB), the value assigned value to 
biodiversity or genetic diversity is usually a measure of diversity per se and not 
linked to the value of specific genes as inputs to human production of goods and 
services. To our knowledge XB is the only exception. XB  examines a model 
where the various plants vary in their resistance to insect pests. The genetic 
model in XB is assumed described by a Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. A Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, sometimes referred to as a law, is characterised by the 
distribution of genotype frequencies being constant from generation to generation. 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium applies to large populations with random 
mating. Crucially, this equilibrium assumes that there are no selection effects.  
 
However based on the knowledge that human harvesting affects the distribution 
of genes, we will utilize a genetic model were the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium 
does not apply, except in steady state. The difference lays in that in our model 
resource harvesting affects the rate at which natural selection occurs. The 
difference between the genetic components in XB and our study may be summed 
up as XB employing a model with slow population dynamics and rapid genetics 
whereas in our model population dynamics are rapid and genetics are slow. The 
appropriateness of the different approaches depends on the relationship between 
biomass growth and the length of the reproductive cycle, with our model being 
more appropriate for resources with relatively long reproductive cycles. This 
would be the case with e.g. mammals and large fish. 
 
We will use the genetic model to further construct a bioeconomic model where we 
analyze the effect of selective harvesting on genetic frequency for one specific 
gene in terms of the socially optimal long-term management of the resource. This   6
objective is determined solely through the profits generated by harvesting. We do 
not specify why harvesting is selective, but take this as given.  
 
A Model with Population and Genetic Dynamics. 
Population dynamics 
Consider a population with two phenotypes, labeled “bad” (B) and “good” (G). 
The biomass of each phenotype at any given time is given by xi, i = G, B. Total 
biomass is given by x = xG + xB. The population dynamics of each phenotype is 
assumed driven by the following differential equations: 
  1, , .
GB
ii i i ii
xx
xr x xh i G B
K
+    = −− δ − =    
  (1) 
Here ri is growth rate, δi are mortality rate and both are positive parameters, K 
is the carrying capacity and hi is harvesting of biomass belonging to phenotype i. 
The total change in biomass is given by x   =  GB xx +  . We want to consider the 
regulation of the population when different phenotypes have different biological 
productivity. It is assumed that phenotype B is biologically less productive than 
phenotype G. We model this by assuming that that rB = rG = r and δG < δB < r. 
The expression r – δB is the intrinsic growth rate of phenotype B, and will be 
important in the sequel. It is further assumed that the number of individuals is 
equally proportional to the biomass for both phenotypes and the proportion is 
arbitrarily set to one. This implies that the number of individuals of each 
phenotype is equal to the biomass. An expression that is of importance below is 
the  coefficient of selection, s. This coefficient gives the relative fitness of one 
phenotype relative to another, i.e., a measure of the extent to which natural 
selection is acting to reduce the relative contribution of a given genotype to the 
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 (2) 
In the absence of harvesting, s = s* = δB – δG > 0 indicating that G is selected 
for. s* is the intrinsic coefficient of selection. It can be shown that in the absence 
of harvesting there is only one stable biological equilibrium given by xB = 0 and 
xG  =  K(1 – δG/r) However, if harvesting effort directed at phenotype G is 
sufficiently large relative to harvesting effort directed at phenotype B, then s 
changes sign and G is selected against, leading to reduction in the xG stock and 
even the extinction of phenotype G. There is therefore a risk that genetic 
resources will be mismanaged if not properly considered in management 
strategies. It is this possibility that is the main motivation for this paper. 
 
Genetic Dynamics 
The determination of phenotypes is determined by the gene frequency.
2 Here a 
standard model of Mendelian genetics is assumed. There are two alleles, A and a, 
of the same gene. Thus there are two possible homozygotes, AA and aa, and one 
heterozygote Aa. When relating the genotype to the phenotype, a large number 
of variations are possible. Here it is assumed that individuals of genotype AA and 
Aa are of phenotype G and individuals of genotype aa are B. Let the frequency of 
a be q. Under the assumption that mating between genotypes is non-preferential 
and well mixed, the frequency of AA is (1 – q)2, the frequency of Aa is 2q(1 – q) 
and the frequency of aa is q2. the fraction of x that is xG is hence (1 – q)2 +  2q(1 
                                     
2 There is an important issue that is suppressed here. Here all of the phenotypic variation is 
prescribed to genetic variation. In the real world, part of the morphologic variation in a given 
species size is due to phenotypic plasticity. This is the morphological variation that is possible 
within a single genetic variety. This plasticity is caused by environmental factors. The frequency 
of different phenotypes may in itself be on such environmental factor.   8
– q) = 1 – q2. It follows that xG = (1 – q2)x and xB = q2x. We further assume that 
only the individuals of type G are of commercial interest, and that harvesting is 
totally selective such that no harvesting of type B occurs. The changes in x are 
therefore determined by the following differential equation: 
  ()
22 11 GB G
x
xr x q x q xh
K
   = −− δ− − δ −     
  (3) 
Because of the evolutionary pressure imposed by selection, the Hardy-Weinberg 
law may not apply and q will be a non-constant function of time. It can be shown 














  (4) 
Here s is given by Equation (2). From Equation (4) it is obvious that if s is a 
constant not equal to zero, then there are only two steady states, q = 0 and q = 
1. If B is selected against, then s is positive and q approaches zero for any initial 
value of q. This will for instance be the case in the absence of harvesting when s 
= –(δB – δG) > 0. If s is negative, then G is selected against and q converges to 1. 
 
Optimal Management 
The following analysis will focus on how selection affects the dynamics of q. For 
most species, genetic dynamics are relatively slow compared to population 
dynamics. It is therefore assumed that the population at every point in time is at 
a population dynamic equilibrium determined by x   = 0. By solving (3) with 
respect to hG the following relationship between x and hG is found  
                                     
3 This is a basic result in quantitative genetics. See e.g. Falconer and Mackey (1996) for an 
exposition.   9
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 (5) 
It assumed that the harvesting depends on harvesting effort, E such that: 
  ()
2 1 GG hx E q x E = γ = γ−  (6) 
were γ is the catchability coefficient. Inserting this expression into Equation (5) 
and solving for x gives: 






= −δ −γ + δ− δ+ γ  (7) 
Instantaneous harvesting is then given by  
  ()
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γ−
= −δ −γ + δ− δ+ γ  (8) 
 
Further, it follows from (6) and (2) that the coefficient of selection, s, is given by: 
  BG sE = δ− δ− γ (9) 
To examine the optimal regulation of the natural resource, it is assumed that a 
regulator wants to maximize the discounted profits from harvesting the resource. 
Harvesting is assumed to be costless and valued at an exogenous price p. The 
objective function is then: 
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where ρ is the discount rate. The maximisation in Equation (10) is performed 
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The Hamiltonian for this problem is given by: 
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 (12) 
 
In addition to the relevant transversality conditions, necessary conditions for an 




























−δ − δ − γ
 (13) 
 























λ = ρλ + −δ −γ + −δ − δ − γ
δ− δ− γ − +
+ λδ − δ − γ
−δ − δ − γ

 (14) 
The complexity of the condition in (13) and (14) give little hope of finding an 
explicit solution that fully characterizes the problem. Further, isolating E in 
Equation (13) involves solving a cubic polynomial. However, Equation (11) has a 
structure that enables us to find steady states with relative ease. From Equation 
(11) it is evident that there are three conditions under which  0 q =  . q = 0, q = 1 
                                     
4 By calculating the second derivative with respect to E one can show that the Hamiltonian is not 
necessarily concave with respect to E. In this case, setting E = 0 will maximize the Hamiltonian. 
This is not further discussed.    11
and s =  BGE δ− δ− γ = 0. The two first cases correspond to either of the genes 
not being present in the population. The case  BGE δ− δ− γ = 0 is the most 
interesting as both genes are present in the population. Note that in steady state, 
evolution does not select for any of the genes. 
The steady state value of λ when s = 0 is given by: 










The negativity of λ is an obvious implication of B being unwanted. Inserting this 
value of λ and s = 0 into (13) gives a fourth order polynomial equation for 
determining steady state value of q.  
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γ  = −δ − − δ −δ − − −δ δ −δ −  
(16) 
Here a0 = r + δG – 2δB, a1 = 0, a2 = –(r + 2δG – 3δB), a3 =  () ( )
2
BB G r ρ −− δ δ − δ  
and a4 =  () ( )
1 22 BB G r ρ −δ− ρδ− δ . The expression Θ(q) is key to determining not 
only the steady state values of q, but also the stability properties of these steady 
states. A fourth order polynomial may have at most four real roots. The sign of 
a3 is negative given the assumptions of the model. The signs of the other 
parameters are determined by the values of r, δG, δB and ρ. The root q=1 can be 
determined form the expression (15) and since a1=0 then q=0 is a solution to 
() 0 qq ∂Θ ∂ =  so there must be at least one root in q<0. There are therefore two 
roots that can potentially be found in [0, 1). The following expressions are 
important in determining the number of roots in [0, 1). 
  () () () () () ( ) 0
2
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ρ
(17)   12
If  () 00 Θ >  and  ( ) 10 ′ Θ >  there can be only one root in [0, 1). Similarly, if 
() 00 Θ <  and  ( ) 10 ′ Θ <  there can be only one root in [0, 1). Further, since the 
sign of a3 is negative by assumption there cannot exist a root in [0, 1) for 
() 00 Θ >  and  ( ) 10 ′ Θ < . For the last case,  () 00 Θ >  and  ( ) 10 ′ Θ < , there can 
either exist no or two roots depending on the parameter values of expression (16). 
We can therefore limit our discussion to these five cases.  
Before we begin, let us consider the interpretation of the three key expressions 
that make up Equation (16). First, the expression ( ) B r −δ  gives the intrinsic 
productivity of phenotype B. It measures how fast phenotype B regenerates. This 
is of interest since the heterozygotes are of phenotype G and the more productive 
phenotype  B is the more it contributes to the growth of the commercially 
interesting heterozygotes. Second, the expression () BG δ− δ  gives the selection in 
absence of harvesting or the rate at which nature selects for phenotype G. This 
can also be interpreted as the internal rate of return on preserving phenotype G, 
since only phenotype G is of value and the stock size is in steady state. The third 
part is simply the discount rate ρ, which measures the alternative value of capital 
to the returns on alternative investments 
Case 1,  Θ(0) > 0 and  () 1 ′ Θ  > 0, corresponding to  B r −δ > BG δ− δ and 
BG δ− δ> ρ. This implies that phenotype B has higher intrinsic productivity than 
the internal rate of return on preserving phenotype G, which again indicates that 
some positive value of q is optimal. However, the internal rate of return is greater 
than the alternative value of capital, given by the discount rate, which indicates 
that extinction of the G type cannot be optimal. Θ(0) > 0 and  () 1 ′ Θ  > 0 
indicate one, and only one, root to Θ(q) = 0 in the interval (0, 1), since the 
maximum number of roots is two. The shape of Θ(q) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
There are two steady states, q = 1 and q = q*, as expected. The stability 
properties of these steady states are of some interest. Here we use a heuristic 
method based on the fact that Θ(q) is the instantaneous marginal benefit of E, 
evaluated for the steady state value of E, given q. This implies that close to the 
steady state values of q, Θ(q) is close to the marginal benefit of an increment in   13
E relative to the steady state value. Thus for a value of q slightly smaller than 
q*, Θ(q) > 0 so it pays to increase E relative to the steady state value of E. 
Because of the particular shape of q , this implies that q will increase and move 
towards  q*. For values of q slightly larger than q*,  Θ(q) < 0 so it pays to 
decrease E slightly relative to the steady state value of E. q  will then be negative 






Figure 1, Θ(q) for Case 1. 
 
By the same reasoning, q = 1 is unstable. If q is slightly smaller than 1, Θ(q) < 0 
so it pays to decrease E relative to the steady state value. q will then decrease 
and move away from the steady state. Now q = 0 is not a steady state. The 
figure therefore fully supports the initial interpretation that some coexistence of 
the two phenotypes is optimal. As Θ(q) is only equal to the true value of the 
marginal benefit of q when Θ(q) = 0, Θ(q) may be significantly different from the   14
marginal benefit of E. However, it can be shown that Θ(0) has the same sign as 
the true value of the marginal value of E evaluated at E = 0. Therefore, one 
would want to increase E relative to the steady state for all q < q* and q will 
therefore increase until q = q*. q* is therefore a stable steady state and for any 
initial value of q ∈ [0, 1), optimal management will converge to this steady state 
where both genotypes are present in equilibrium. The argument above indicates 
that that the sign of  ( ) * q ′ Θ  determines the stability property of the steady 
state. This is formally shown in the appendix. 
 
Case 2. Θ(0) > 0 and  () 1 ′ Θ  < 0.  This corresponds to  B r −δ > BG δ− δ and 
BG δ− δ< ρ. The first inequality implies that phenotype B has higher intrinsic 
productivity than the internal rate of return on preserving phenotype G. Some 
q>0 is therefore optimal. However, the internal rate of return is less than the 
alternative value of capital indicating that the value of the resource is better 
managed in alternative investments. The shape of Θ(q) is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Here, Θ(q) > 0 for all q. The optimal choice of E is therefore always higher than 
the steady state level of E and q  → 1 as t  →∞. For this combination of 
parameter values, it is always optimal to let the gene A become extinct.  






Figure 2, Θ (q) for Case 2. 
 
Case 3, Θ(0) < 0 and  () 1 ′ Θ  > 0. This case has two possible solutions, no and 
two roots in [0,1). The first inequality corresponds to  B r −δ < BG δ− δ, which 
implies that phenotype B has lower intrinsic productivity than the internal rate 
of return on preserving phenotype G, which does not imply that a positive value 
of q is optimal. Further,  BG δδρ − > implies that the internal rate of return is 
greater than the alternative value of capital, given by the discount rate, which 
indicates that extinction of type G  cannot be optimal. Let us look at the 
graphical illustration of each case. Figure 3a shows the case with no roots in [0,1) 
where it does not pay to harvest the steady state levels of E for any value of q. 
Here the intrinsic rate of growth for phenotype B is so low and the internal 
interest rate so high that phenotype B never becomes a significant part of the 
population. This case may be interpreted as the case that gives the same result as   16
the standard resource management model without selection. However, this 






Figure 3a, Θ (q) for Case 3 with one root. 
On the other hand figure 3b shows the solution with two roots in [0,1), e.g. for 
the parameter values: r=0.61, δG=0.28, δB=0.45 and ρ=0.15. In this case it does 
not pay to harvest the steady state levels of E for any value of q below q1. 
However if q, e.g. by mismanagement, gets pushed to the steady state level q1 the 
sign changes and it becomes optimal to increase effort until a new equilibrium is 
reached at q2. The steady state point q1 is an unstable equilibrium, a Skiba point 
(Skiba 1978). On the other hand, q2 is a stable equilibrium since it is optimal to 
reduce effort for any q > q2 and optimal management will converge to this steady 




1 * q 2 * q
 
Figure 3b, Θ (q) for Case 3 with two roots. 
 
Case 4.  Θ(0) < 0 and  () 1 ′ Θ  < 0. which corresponds to  B r −δ < BG δ− δ 
and BG δ− δ< ρ. The first inequality implies that phenotype B has lower intrinsic 
productivity than the internal rate of return on preserving phenotype G, which 
does not imply that a positive value of q is optimal. However, the second 
inequality implies that the internal rate of return is less than the alternative 
value of capital, which indicates that extinction of phenotype G can be optimal. 
This is the most dangerous case in terms of classical management where genetic 
resources are not taken into account. It is optimal to conserve at low levels of q, 
because of the low productivity of phenotype B but at some point the low 
internal rate of return makes the extinction of phenotype G optimal. This case is 
illustrated in figure 4. It shows a steady state in the interior of [0, 1), but this 







Figure 4, Θ(q) for Case 4. 
 
For low values of q, it is optimal to set E below the steady state level and 
conserve the highest possible fraction of phenotype G.  This raises the question of 
economic management of resources that have been historically poorly managed. 
Such poor management may lead to initial values of q, that may well be larger 
than q*. At this point, the density dependence of biomass growth has rendered 
phenotype G relatively unproductive. The cost of restoring phenotype G is then 
                                     
5 There has recently been an increasing interest in Skiba points in the resource economic 
literature on non-linear natural resource problems. See e.g. Brock and Starrett (2003) or Crépin 
(2003). The results presented in these papers are consistent with the conclusions presented here.   19
too high as it is only weakly selected for in the absence of harvesting. The term 
weakly selected for is here defined relative to the interest rate. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have addressed the optimal management of the genetic resources 
of a renewable resource. The results presented in this paper suggest an interesting 
dichotomy between economic and biological factors with clear links to established 
results in natural resource economics. The model identifies two important 
determinants of optimal management, one for a small share of the inferior gene 
and another for a large share. An increase in the frequency of an unwanted gene, 
q, is optimal if the intrinsic growth rate of the unwanted phenotype exceeds the 
internal rate of return in the resource.  On the other hand, an increase in q at a 
high frequency is optimal if the internal rate of return in the resource exceeds the 
opportunity cost of capital, measured by the discount rate. We identify five 
different solutions to the problem. Two solutions are of special interest to current 
management regimes of natural resources. Both involve low intrinsic growth rates 
of the inferior phenotype compared to the internal rate of return. We have shown 
that a Skiba point may exist in such solutions where mismanagement of genetic 
resources may lead to an increase in the frequency of an inferior gene beyond a 
point where extinction is the optimal solution. 
There are two simplifications in the present model whose inclusion affects the 
result. First, the productivity and cost of harvesting is not affected by the 
composition of the stock. It seems reasonable to suspect that this is not the case, 
e.g. that the lower the frequency of phenotype G the higher the harvest cost. 
Second, we assume that only phenotype G is of commercial value and that no 
harvest occurs of phenotype B. This simplification describes trophy hunting fairly 
well but is a poor description of many renewable natural resources such as 
fisheries. However, since this problem is a very relevant in fisheries, as 
technological improvements allow more selective fishing, this assumption should   20
be challenged. Our results demonstrate that it may be of great importance for the 
optimal management of natural resources that the management of genes is taken 
into account 
   21
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Appendix. Formal Proof of the Stability Analysis 
In the main text, a sufficiency condition for the stability of a steady state q* is 
that  ( ) * q ′ Θ  < 0. Conversely, a sufficiency condition for instability of q* is that 





δ− δ ∂ = . To prove this consider the following 
general optimal control problem: 
  () () ()
0
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t UqEe d ts t q fqE q
∞
−ρ = ∫    
Along the optimal path,  () () , qf q E q =  . Here E(q) is the optimal choice of E as a 
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An expression for  dE
dq  may be found by implicitly differentiating the first order 
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= − = −
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ + λ + λ
  
It follows from the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to E that the sign 
of  dE
dq  is the same as the sign of  () q ′ Θ . In the model used in the main text one 
















= is the same as the sign of  () q ′ Θ  which confirms the stability analysis in 
the main text.  